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Introduction

The purpose of the paper is to describe a performance improvement project that
implemented a standard sentinel event management model based on best practices and principles
of high reliability organizations. The project utilized define, measure, analyze, improve, and
control (DMAIC) performance improvement methodology and Lewin’s Theory of Planned
Change. The project took place at an acute care hospital that is part of a not-for-profit healthcare
system in Louisville, KY.
It is estimated that one in four American families will be affected by preventable harm in
healthcare, involving further medical care, disability or even death (Denham, Sullenberger,
Quaid, & Nance, 2012). Prevalence studies have estimated that between 3% and 16% of
American patients experience preventable harm as a result of healthcare. The Institute of
Medicine estimates that over 100,000 preventable deaths occur from healthcare each year
(Macrae, 2008). The healthcare industry has improved its ability to identify harm related events;
most of these events result in some type of formal investigation and analysis (Agency for
Healthcare Quality and Research, 2010). However, safety in healthcare will not improve until
organizational learning from adverse events takes place (Macrae, 2008).
Healthcare has examined other industries, such as aviation and chemical processing, for
safety strategies. This has led to widespread use of safety event reporting systems. Macrae
(2008) explains that when healthcare adopted safety event reporting systems, many of the
essential participatory aspects were lost in the transfer. Participation of the people closest to the
work challenges deeply held assumptions about who holds relevant knowledge, who is
considered an expert and who is both able to participate and responsible for participating in the
risk mitigation (Macrae, 2008). The traditional, hierarchical nature of healthcare organizational
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structures makes participation in safety improvement more challenging (Roussel & Swansburg,
2009). Event identification and lessons learned should be disseminated throughout healthcare
organizations to prevent future occurrences. Learning from failures is a process that requires
collaboration, decentralization and the ability to engage front line caregivers to fully understand
the causes and successfully implement changes (Macrae, 2008).
Learning from adverse events requires three types of responses. The first response,
identification, is the process of identifying adverse events and bringing them to the attention of
others in the organization. The second, analysis, refers to the process of analyzing the event with
a focus on identifying system level failures and process breakdowns. The third, change, refers to
the way organizations implement corrective actions to reduce or eliminate reoccurrence of the
adverse event (Ginsburg et al., 2009). The most significant opportunities to improve
organizational learning from adverse events may exist around participatory management and
change management (Macrae, 2008).
Review of Literature
A search was conducted in the EBSCOhost database using the key words patient safety,
medical harm, adverse event and sentinel event. Filters included English language, peer
reviewed and published in the last 10 years. Duplicates were removed. Relevant articles were
selected based on information related to the current state and evidence-based solutions to close
the clinical gap previously identified between best practices and the health system policies and
processes. Additional searches were conducted using the Google internet search engine relative
to patient safety organizations, resources and regulation. National and international
recommendations and guidelines were identified. Regulatory and accreditation standards were
also identified for the United States. Seminal literature on patient safety was included, regardless
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of publication dates. The literature was appraised using the Johns Hopkins Nursing Evidence –
Based Practice model. The evidence ranged from level IV to level V which are the lowest two
evidence levels and generally consist of nationally recognized expert opinion and literature
reviews. The quality rating were A, high quality or B, good quality (Dearholt & Dang, 2012).
Consistent themes for adverse event management fell into the three major categories of
identification, analysis and change. Gaps between organizational learning from failure in high
reliability organizations, and organizational learning from adverse events in healthcare were
identified in the literature.
Current Guidelines and Recommendations for Management of Adverse Events
Several national and international patient safety organizations have published guidelines
or recommendations for adverse event management (see Table 1). The guidelines are generally
based on reviews of literature and expert opinion. The majority of the guidelines focus on event
identification, analysis and change. Some guidelines include prevention and preparation as well
as immediate crisis intervention. Additional categories include disclosure of events, patient and
family involvement, Just Culture principles and measures of the effectiveness of action plans.
Organizational learning was identified as a theme in the guidelines (Bagian et al., 2015; Conway,
Federico, Stewart & Campbell, 2011; Hoppes, Mitchell, Vendetti, & Bunting, 2012; National
Center for Patient Safety, 2011; Taylor-Adams & Vincent, 2001; World Health Organization,
2005).
Identification.
The identification response to adverse events includes recognizing an event has occurred,
notifying the appropriate people about the event and launching the investigation to determine
more information about what occurred. A formalized team response should be planned for
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adverse events. Efforts should be made to increase the engagement of staff and leaders at all
levels of the organization in safety improvement (Bagian et al., 2015; Hoppes et al., 2012).
Systems should be developed to identify adverse events as early as possible and as often as
possible. Organizations have an opportunity to improve patient safety by performing equal
investigations for all adverse events and near misses instead of just adverse events (Rivard,
Rosen, & Carroll, 2006). The timeliness of investigations should be monitored. Additionally,
the organization should consider a consistent role of the patient/family in the investigation
process (Conway et al., 2011).
Analysis.
The analysis response to adverse events involves careful review of the event and a
systematic process to determine why and how the event occurred. This includes identification of
individual and system causal factors. Processes should be developed for performing and
reporting the results of aggregate reviews of adverse events and near misses. This is consistent
with high reliability organization principles and would provide the opportunity for more learning
and prevention of future events (National Center for Patient Safety, 2011). Formalization of
analysis teams with training in root cause analysis methodology could make the analysis process
more consistent and more effective. Focused efforts to determine relevant contributing factors
should occur (Bagian et al., 2015). There are inconsistent recommendations regarding the
participation of the caregivers directly involved in the event (Bagian et al., 2015; Conway et al.,
2011; National Center for Patient Safety, 2011). The current process of inclusion has contributed
to challenges in the analysis process.
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Change.
The change response to adverse events involves developing action items that are directly
linked to the causal factors found in the analysis in order to prevent recurrence of the adverse
event. Action items should be specific, assigned to an owner, include a deadline and be tracked
for completion (Bagian et al., 2015; Taylor-Adams & Vincent, 2001). Considerable effort should
be used to standardize processes to measure the completion and effectiveness of action items
following an adverse event. Metrics can be developed and routinely reported to display progress
and demonstrate sustainable efforts to prevent future adverse events (Bagian et al., 2015; Hoppes
et al., 2012). The Board of Trustees and senior leaders should be accountable to overseeing the
specific monitoring and improvement efforts (Conway et al., 2011).
There are key organizational learning strategies from high reliability organizations that
should be considered for adverse event management. High reliability organizations recognize
the value of feedback loops and effective communication about safety reporting and safety
related activities. These communication channels can be formalized to further engage people at
all organizational levels in safety reporting and associated activities. Open communication about
adverse event frequency, lessons learned and success stories should be shared within healthcare
organizations. Participatory management strategies from high reliability organizations can be
utilized during adverse event management. There is an opportunity to shift the hierarchical
healthcare culture from deference to authority, to deference to expertise. High reliability
organizations consistently generate alerts, reports and stories from safety event reviews which
are disseminated to everyone involved in the work (Ginsburg et al., 2009).
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Clinical Practice Problem

Response to adverse events at this healthcare system was guided by system policy and
procedure which was based on The Joint Commission sentinel event policy for hospitals. The
risk management department led investigations and cause analyses that were conducted on
adverse events in conjunction with the leaders from the area involved, including the quality
department. Each hospital and the physician practice group had directors of risk management
assigned. These directors consistently followed the organization’s policies and procedures but
there was variation in the tools and methodology used during this work. Leaders felt the process
was sometimes ineffective and did not always decrease the likelihood of recurrence.
Leaders at the healthcare system expressed this process felt more like a regulatory
requirement than a patient safety improvement strategy. The staff and providers who were
directly involved in the adverse event were present for the analysis and action plan. This made
some people feel it was a punitive process and sometimes resulted in defensiveness which
distracted from the objective analysis of the event. Leader engagement in the process was low in
some areas and corrective actions were not always tracked for completion and monitored for
effectiveness. A clinical gap was identified between the healthcare system’s policy and
procedure and the guidelines and best practices for patient safety event management found in the
literature.
The purpose of this performance improvement project was to implement a standard
sentinel event management model in an acute care hospital that is part of a healthcare system,
based on best practices and principles of high reliability organizations.
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Methods

The project utilized the DMAIC performance improvement model which was the
standard improvement model in place at the healthcare system. This model included five phases:
define, measure, analyze, improve and control (Sokovic, Pavletic, & Pipan, 2010). The project
scope focused on sentinel events as they are the subcategory of adverse events that tend to be the
most serious. The project scope did not include the immediate medical response to the patient,
disclosure to the patient or family, or claim or litigation management of the event. Additional
performance improvement work for individual sentinel events, such as falls with serious injuries,
occurred at the hospital and unit level at the same time as this project. Consideration was given
to the overall healthcare system patient safety strategic plan when defining the scope of the
project. The current patient safety strategic plan spanned six years. This project was considered
to be foundational to future work, and the scope was chosen, based on the state of the culture of
the organization at the time of the project.
The DMAIC performance improvement model was team-based. The DNP student, also
referred to as the project leader, developed and led the performance improvement team to
conduct this project. The team consisted of a performance improvement coach, an executive
sponsor, and representatives from key stakeholder groups. These stakeholders included the
patient safety reporting system administrator, directors of risk management, and leaders from the
acute care hospital that had key roles in managing sentinel events. Input from front line staff and
medical staff was gathered during the define and improve phases. The team leader was
responsible for making sure the objectives of each DMAIC phase were met and the team
remained within the project timeline. The executive sponsor helped the team overcome barriers
and maintained the project status as an organizational priority. The performance improvement
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coach assisted the team in selecting and utilizing the appropriate performance improvement tools
to meet the project objectives. The stakeholder group representatives ensured the work was
accurate and feasible and helped champion the changes to the process among their peers, staff
and providers.
One acute care hospital was identified to participate in the DMAIC performance
improvement project. The hospital was chosen based on multiple factors. The leadership team
was committed to patient safety improvement and had expressed a desire to improve this specific
process. They felt this project fit into the other activities that were underway. Additionally, the
large size of the hospital and the high level acuity of the patient population increased the
likelihood of a patient safety event occurring during the project. This was an important factor to
consider because harm related patient safety events are low volume and there was a limited
amount of time to pilot test the standard model during the performance improvement project.
Define Phase
The project team was established during the define phase, including executive level
support. The team defined the problem and operational definitions were provided. The project
description, scope, goal and timeline were all agreed upon. Performance improvement tools that
were used during this phase of the project included the project charter, the Suppliers, Inputs,
Process, Outputs, Customers (SIPOC), an affinity diagram of the voice of the customer, a project
communication plan and project timeline (see Table 2). The project charter clearly outlined the
scope of the project and was used to secure the necessary support and resources as well as obtain
key stakeholder support.
The review of literature and evidence appraisal had been conducted by the project team
leader but this information was not presented to the team until a later phase. Kurt Lewin’s
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Theory of Planned Change was used with the performance improvement team. Lewin’s theory
includes three phases that support change within a system. The first phase is called unfreezing
and is essentially the preparation for the planned change. The second phase is moving and
requires both a detailed plan to test the change and engagement of the people involved in the
change. Lewin’s third phase is called freezing and this is where the new state is stabilized and
becomes part of the culture to be sustained over time (Lewin, 1997). Like most healthcare
organizations, this healthcare system had a centralized and hierarchical organizational structure.
This structure was identified as a potential restraining force to the project. The project leader
focused on participatory management strategies such as effective communication and
engagement during the unfreezing and moving stages to help the team let go of the old process
and make the necessary changes proposed by the project (Shirey, 2013).
The stakeholders for the project included the Board of Trustees, with emphasis on the
clinical quality and safety sub-committee, senior leaders, facility leaders, risk and quality
directors, department leaders, frontline staff, patients, and patients’ families. The project
proposal was submitted to the Institutional Review Board and the health system for institutional
approval. Data collection and reporting during the project was done in compliance with all
organizational, state and federal regulations. The project leader was sensitive to the
organizational policies related to external reporting of sentinel event information due to a lack of
peer review privilege and tort reform in the state of Kentucky as well as Patient Safety
Organization regulations.
The project was funded by the healthcare system and there were essentially no upfront
costs associated with it. There were 14 people on the performance improvement team including
the team leader. The project leader and team members were salary employees whose
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participation in the project was supported by hospital and healthcare system leadership. The
project required time from the project leader, the project team members, the patient safety
reporting system administrator, and time from in-house legal counsel. The team held eight one
hour meetings and one two hour meeting. Occasionally, the team members were asked to do
work outside of meeting time. Meeting space was allocated by the hospital for the project.
Approximately $200 was spent on the team celebration at the end of the project. The estimated
time dedicated to the project can be seen in Figure 1. Development and implementation of the
replication plan for the healthcare system was not included in the estimated project hours.

Team Member

Estimated Project Hours

Project leader
Director of risk management
Executive sponsor
Average project team member
Patient Safety Reporting System administrator time
Risk management team education
In-house legal counsel

300
80
25
15
20
6
5

Figure 1. Project Time Requirement. The project required time of the project leader, director of risk
management, executive sponsor, project team members, patient safety reporting system administrator
and in-house legal counsel.

Measure Phase
The team developed a deep understanding of the current sentinel event management
process during the measure phase of the project. This was demonstrated using a process map.
The team used an affinity diagram to identify barriers to the ideal sentinel event management
process. The project leader continued to use change theory during this phase. Additional
barriers to the implementation of a standard sentinel event management model were identified
using Lewin’s force field analysis tool (see Figure 2). Lewin’s theory states that the restraining
forces cannot be removed but they can be countered by increasing the driving forces (Shirey,
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2013). The team reviewed available data on sentinel events to establish a baseline. The
healthcare system had not previously collected data regarding the management of sentinel events
so there was limited information available in that area.

Figure 2. Force Field Analysis. The force field analysis describes both the driving forces and the
restraining forces of the change related to the project.

Analyze Phase
During the analyze phase, the team identified opportunities for process improvement
using a gap analysis. The current policies and procedures were compared to the review of
literature including the national and international guidelines. During this comparison, the team
identified the specific clinical gaps in each major category of event management (see Table 3).
Improve Phase
The improve phase was the most time consuming phase of the project. In this phase, the
team designed the new sentinel event management model to be tested. The clinical gaps
identified from the literature were used to propose changes in the process for the model.
Consideration was given to information learned during the earlier phases of the project. The
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team used a process map to establish the future state process for sentinel event management. A
toolkit was developed to support the new process to be tested at one acute care hospital. See
Table 4 for an outline of the standard sentinel event management model and associated toolkit.
All team members provided input to the future state process and toolkit which helped support the
change. The team chose a timeframe for the pilot and developed communication and
implementation plans for this phase. Data were collected for the project evaluation and later
used in the control phase.
The standard sentinel event management model developed by the performance
improvement team incorporated a planned, team response. The team consisted of an executive
sponsor of the event, operational leaders of the area involved and the director of risk
management. Standard tools were used by the event management team to assist with the
identification, analysis and change responses to the events. The model utilized a series of three
meetings. The first meeting was held as soon as possible and within 48-72 hours of identification
of the event. The goal of the this meeting was to gather the known facts, ensure the needs of the
patient, family, staff and providers were being met, and plan any immediate risk mitigation. The
investigation of the event was planned and the people who were directly involved were identified
for interviews. The investigation and analysis of the event were conducted to determine what
happened and begin to determine why and how it happened. The team developed a flow chart
time line and identified the individual and system factors that led to the event.
The purpose of the second meeting was the analysis. At this time, the team validated the
findings of the investigation including what happened and why it happened. The causal and
contributing factors were identified and tested. This meeting was attended by the core event
management team and peer representatives of the clinical staff and providers who were directly
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involved in the event. Some attendees were assigned homework to review literature and
professional practice standards to help the team develop corrective actions to try to prevent
recurrence of a similar event. Approximately two weeks later, the third meeting was held to
facilitate change through the development of action items. The actions developed were specific,
measurable, included a deadline and were assigned to a specific person. After the three meetings
concluded, the director of risk management documented the work and produced an event
summary sheet. This sheet was used to provide follow up to the staff and providers who were
directly involved in the event. Additionally, the summary sheet was used to share the patient
story within the facility and healthcare system for organizational learning. Lastly, metrics were
developed to measure the use of the model to manage these events.
The DMAIC tools used in the improve phase such as the implementation and
communication plan helped the team transition through the change. People affected by the
change tend to be less resistant when the communication clearly establishes what is in it for them
(Mitchell, 2013). The team members were assigned to parts of the communication plan allowing
them to champion the change to their peer leaders as well as the staff and providers at the
hospital. The pilot testing period lasted 3 months. The project leader audited the sentinel events
that were reported during this time using an audit tool developed by the team (see Table 5).
Audit results were presented to the team at the end of the pilot testing period. The team
validated the audits and discussed the challenges faced during the pilot. Lastly, the team
members made recommendations to mitigate these challenges for greater long term success.
These recommendations were also considered in the replication plan.
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Pilot evaluation plan.
Process and outcome metrics were used to evaluate the effectiveness of the pilot and can
be seen in Table 6. The primary process metric was the percentage of sentinel events managed
using the standard event management model. An additional process metric was the percentage
of event summary sheets completed for organizational learning. Reports were obtained from the
patient safety reporting system to determine the events that met criteria for the audit. All sentinel
events reported during the pilot testing period were audited.
The outcome measure was the number of reported sentinel events per 1,000 adjusted
patient days for the acute care hospital. This rate was not measured by the facility before this
project. Due to the change in the sentinel event definition by The Joint Commission on January
1, 2015, the measurement began with 2015 data as the baseline and will be measured through the
control plan. The long term goal was to decrease the rate of sentinel events each year after
implementation of the standard event management model. See Table 7 for the project logic
model which outlines the key resources, activities, metrics and the impact of the project.
Control Phase
During the control phase, the team developed a control plan to monitor the process over
the long term. This plan included five metrics, some of which were measured during the project
pilot (see Table 8). Additionally, the team handed the process off to the appropriate hospital
leaders to oversee the standard process after the project completion. The team developed a
replication plan to implement the process at other areas of the healthcare system (see Table 9).
The team also held a celebration to recognize the team members and the positive impact the
project achieved.
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Results

A report from the hospital's patient safety reporting system was used to identify sentinel
events for the testing period. Each event was audited retrospectively using the audit tool created
by the performance improvement team to measure the project process metrics. The audits were
reviewed by the performance improvement team members to ensure the audits were accurate.
Any disagreements were discussed until there was full agreement. All sentinel events that were
reported within the pilot testing period were managed using the standard event management
model which met the project goal. No events were managed using the old process. Some events
had all the steps completed during the testing period. Each of these events had a sentinel event
summary sheet completed and turned in which also met the project process metric goal. For
other events, the process was started but the management process was not able to be completed
due to the time limitation of the pilot testing period. One event was not classified as a sentinel
event but there was a desire to perform a root cause analysis; therefore, the new model was used
for that event as well. This event was not included in the project audits since it was not a
sentinel event.
The number of sentinel events, percentage of events managed with the standard model
and the percentage of events with completed sentinel event summary sheets were provided to the
team for evaluation. Although the toolkit was a helpful guide during the pilot, it was recognized
that there were areas that needed further clarification and there were some key parts missing such
as talking points for the executive sponsor, interviewing techniques, communication of
homework assignments between the second and third meetings and guidance on implementing
action items.
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Discussion

There was no way to control the volume of events or the type of events during the testing
period. However, the team was satisfied with the results and the opportunities to learn during the
testing period. Each event that was managed during the testing period was different which
provided more learning opportunities for the team. The risk director who facilitated the cause
analysis meetings conducted an informal debrief of the executive sponsor and meeting
participants at the end of most of the meetings. This included the front line staff and providers in
attendance. This information was summarized and shared with the performance improvement
team at the last team meeting.
The performance improvement team believed the new model was more successful than the
previous approach to adverse events. During the pilot testing period, they felt the cause analysis
team had a deeper understanding of what happened and why it happened which allowed them to
link the corrective actions when using the new model. The team believed that the new sentinel
event management model would help the hospital be more likely to prevent a recurrence of a
similar patient safety event. At the beginning of the pilot, the team was concerned about how the
frontline staff and providers would react to the people who were directly involved in the event
not being included in the cause analysis meeting. However, the informal feedback from those
caregivers was overwhelmingly positive during the pilot. For the most part, the interviews and
investigations were thoroughly completed prior to the analysis allowing this transition to occur.
The team also recognized that the team-based event management approach was more successful.
Challenges
During the pilot, the team faced challenges with meeting scheduling and coordination of
the cause analysis meetings, timely access to the people directly involved in the event, and
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education about the new process and cause analysis process in general. Adjustments were made
to the toolkit during the pilot to make it a more useful tool. Small changes were made during the
pilot to mitigate each of these challenges. During the pilot evaluation, the team reviewed the
challenges and made formal recommendations to address them in order to sustain the process.
Limitations
There was no way to control the volume of events, the time in between events or the type
of events to be tested. The volume of sentinel events was low which was expected by the team,
but that did limit the opportunity to test all possible scenarios. Despite the low volume, the team
was satisfied with the learning opportunities that the pilot test provided and felt that it was
successful enough to make recommendations for long term use.
Recommendations
Based on the results of the pilot test, the performance improvement team recommended
this process be sustained at the acute care hospital and replicated to the rest of the healthcare
system. The team recommended some revisions to the toolkit. These revisions were not related
to the core process steps. They provided additional clarification, instruction or made a tool
easier to operationalize. A replication plan was developed for the system risk management and
patient safety leaders to deploy within the organization.
Other healthcare systems who wish to implement an event management model should
consider the use of standard improvement methodology and change management principles. The
structure provided by the DMAIC performance improvement methodology and Lewin’s Theory
of Planned Change helped the team assess the culture at the hospital and determine what level of
change they were ready for and what barriers may be faced during the change. The standard
model may not have been implemented successfully if it had been presented to the hospital by
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the project leader only and not by the team members. The team approach to the project and the
pilot test of change before asking the leaders to commit to permanent change were keys to
success that should be considered by other healthcare systems. The pilot test of change provided
the opportunity for team members to see the changes and how the model worked before making
a long term commitment. The pilot provided a comfort zone where the team members and
stakeholders knew they would have the ability to provide input during the project evaluation and
help influence the final process to be sustained and replicated. The team members were able to
serve as change champions to others within the hospital and help transition to the new sentinel
event model.
Conclusion
High rates of medical harm and preventable deaths have been demonstrated around the
world (Runciman & Moller, 2000). Despite the international awareness and substantial efforts
for improvement, little to no progress has been made in preventing harm to patients (Chassin,
2013). The response to adverse events in healthcare is the opportunity to learn what happened,
why it happened and what may prevent a future occurrence of a similar event (Conway et al.,
2011). Current adverse event management policies are heavily influenced by regulatory
standards and litigation environments which may hinder prevention of future events (Hoppes et
al., 2012). Efforts have been made to compare the successful safety records of high reliability
organizations to healthcare to demonstrate long term organizational change (Kalisch &
Aebersold, 2006).
The healthcare industry is experiencing unprecedented change and can no longer operate
under the status quo. Operating expenses are going up and reimbursements are going down.
Healthcare organizations cannot afford to simply talk about patient safety improvement. Internal
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and external forces continue to add pressure for change that results in measureable improvement
(Marshall, 2011). This project demonstrated that the leadership team was ready to make changes
to the sentinel event management process to improve patient safety. The team remained engaged
throughout the six month project and have committed to sustain the changes by utilizing the
control plan.
The performance improvement team recognized that they will need to remain focused in
the areas that faced challenges during the pilot testing period such as meeting coordination,
access to the people directly involved, and ongoing education regarding cause analysis. The
leaders now have a better understanding that the team-based event management model
recommended in the literature can be more successful than the historical approach of risk
management owning the process. The lessons learned during this project, along with the team’s
recommendations to mitigate the challenges, will be shared with the other areas of the healthcare
system as they replicate the standard sentinel event management model. This foundational work
within the healthcare system’s patient safety strategic plan will contribute to the overall goal of
eliminating preventable patient harm.
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Table 1
National and International Guidelines or Recommendations for Adverse Event Management
Title of
Publication/
Guideline
Author/
Publisher &
Year

Systems Analysis of
Clinical Incidents:
The London Protocol
Sally Taylor-Adams,
Charles Vincent
(2001)

WHO Draft Guidelines for
Adverse Event Reporting
and Learning Systems
World Health Alliance (2005)

Evidence
Level and
Quality*
Setting and
Audience

Level IV, B

Serious Safety Events:
Getting to Zero

Patient Safety Handbook

Respectful Management
of Serious Clinical Events

RCA2: Improving Root
Cause Analysis and
Actions to Prevent Harm
National Patient Safety
Foundation (2015)

National Center for Patient
Safety: A part of the
Veterans Health
Administration (2011)

Jim Conway, Frank
Federico, Kevin Stewart &
Mark J Campbell; Institute
for Healthcare
Improvement (2011)

Level IV, B

Michelle Hoppes. Jacque L
Mitchell, Ellen Grady
Vendetti & Robert F.
Bunting; American Society
for Healthcare Risk
Management (2012)
Level IV, B

Level IV, A

Level IV, A

Level IV, A

Acute care, mental
health, ambulances,
primary care; use by
risk managers or
designated teams
James Reason’s Model
of Organizational
Accidents

All healthcare organizations
in the world interested in
healthcare improvement

All healthcare settings, risk
management and patient
safety professionals

Veterans Health
Administration and
associated caregivers

All healthcare settings;
healthcare executives and
other leaders
internationally

All healthcare, facilities,
patient safety professionals

Review of literature, expert
opinion, surveys of countries
with national reporting
systems

Eliminating preventable harm
is a core value of the
organization; this should be a
competency of risk and
patient safety professionals

High Reliability
Organizations learning from
failures as a model

Review of literature and
expert opinion in patient
safety

Operational
Definition of
Harm
Related
Event

Non-specific; use of
the guidelines
determined by the
seriousness of the
event

Adverse Event: injury related
to medical management,
preventable or not

Serious safety event: a
deviation from generally
acceptable practice or process
that reaches the patient and
causes severe harm or death

Preparation
& Planning

Response team should
be established

Not addressed

Advanced planning, credible
leadership, formalized
planned team responses; crisis
intervention

Adverse Events: untoward
incidents, therapeutic
misadventures, iatrogenic
injuries or other occurrences
directly associated with care
or services provided by
VHA
Interprofessional team
approach

Drawn from fields of
patient and family centered
care, patient safety, service
recovery, crisis
management and disaster
planning
Serious clinical adverse
event: for the most part
preventable and results in
permanent psychological
or physical harm including
death

Theory/
Back-ground

Plan & prepare: develop
transparency, engage
leaders, promote safety as
a core value; use crisis
management team;
prioritize needs of patient,
family and organization

Adverse event: untoward
incident, therapeutic
misadventure, iatrogenic
injury, or other occurrence
of harm or potential harm
directly associated with
care or services provided
Risk based prioritization
system to determine which
events should have cause
analysis; planned team
response, leadership and
board support, define
blameworthy events not
eligible for RCA
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Title of
Publication/
Guideline
Investigation

Systems Analysis of
Clinical Incidents:
The London Protocol
Gather information,
conduct interviews,
establish chronology,
draft flowcharts

WHO Draft Guidelines for
Adverse Event Reporting
and Learning Systems
Not addressed

Analysis

Systems analysis
(strategically not
called root cause);
identify care delivery
problems and
contributing factors

Cause analysis, regression
analysis, systems analysis all
conducted by experts trained
to identify causes

Corrective
Action

Prioritize contributing
factors, establish
responsibility, identify
timeframe, identify
resources needed,
formal sign off for
completion, identify
date to evaluate
effectiveness, action
items categorized by
local, department and
organization and
assigned accordingly
Not addressed

Not addressed

Not addressed

Communication/
Feedback/
Dissemination

Disclosure

Serious Safety Events:
Getting to Zero

Patient Safety Handbook

Respectful Management
of Serious Clinical Events

Planned team response;
information gathering
including interviews, subject
expert consultation,
equipment involved,
environmental factors,
medical record review,
relevant policy and procedure
review, create timeline
Root cause analysis is
common but others are
acceptable

Team performs
investigation; caregivers
directly involved are
interviewed and asked for
suggestions to prevent
similar situations

Recommendations for
preventative strategies should
be developed as soon as
possible

Action plan should be
developed to focus on
prevention of reoccurrence;
metrics should be developed
to measure and report events,
effectiveness of actions and
sustainability of changes

Use actions to drive change,
include human factors
engineering

Establish board
accountability for long
term systems solutions
after each root cause to
ensure resolution, learning
and improvement to the
organization safety

Recommended actions to be
disseminated rapidly through
reports, newsletters, normal
communication channels

Presentation of findings to
leadership and board of
directors; lessons learned
shared locally, regionally or
nationally depending on the
organizational culture and
whether or not there is
pending litigation
Information from analysis
should be shared with patient
and family face to face by a
designated person/group

Alerts, newsletters,
communications, stories of
improvement across the
system

Multiple tools for internal
and external
communications

Staff, patient and families
should receive feedback

Routine response to adverse
events; detailed policy
outlines procedures for this
as VHA

At the time of the event but
also consider ongoing
needs- use support,
empathy, resolution and
learning

Not addressed here

Root cause, aggregated root
cause in focus areas;
includes actual and near
miss events; caregivers
directly involved are
intentionally excluded from
this stage for objectivity;
root cause analysis should
begin immediately and be
complete within 45 days

Include frontline staff to
prevent blame and promote
learning; interviews,
gathering information,
internal reporting about
what happened;
recommendations if
external reporting is
needed
Root cause analysis
performed by skilled/
trained person; should
begin immediately and be
completed within 30 days;
should include patient,
family and caregivers
directly involved- extent of
involvement should be
case by case basis

RCA2: Improving Root
Cause Analysis and
Actions to Prevent Harm
Begin within 72 hours of
notification; fact finding,
interviews, review of
location,
equipment/devices, etc.,
use triggering questions,
involve patient and family
when possible, develop
timeline, flowchart
Use of tools such as cause
and effect diagram and five
why’s recommended,
conducted by team; team
does not include people
directly involved in the
event; should not strive to
identify one root cause but
instead should identify
multiple factors, apply five
rules of causation
Consider use of Veteran
Administration’s action
hierarchy to identify
strength of actions; team
should not sensor
themselves when
developing actions;
measure implementation
and effectiveness with
process and outcome
measures

SENTINEL EVENT
Title of
Publication/
Guideline
Just Culture

Organization
-al Learning
Strategies

Systems Analysis of
Clinical Incidents:
The London Protocol
Separate event
management from
disciplinary
procedures related to
persistent performance
issues by individuals;
work to create open
and just culture
Not addressed
specifically

26
WHO Draft Guidelines for
Adverse Event Reporting
and Learning Systems
Healthcare workers who
report events or safety issues
should not be punished;
reporter identification should
not be disclosed to third
parties

Alerts, safety reports,
dissemination of lessons
learned, common cause
information should all be
reported back to community
of reporters routinely and
rapidly

Serious Safety Events:
Getting to Zero

Patient Safety Handbook

Respectful Management
of Serious Clinical Events

Not addressed

Non-punitive, systems
approach; focus on
prevention not punishment

Based on James Reason’s
work, must eliminate
blame for learning and
healing

Dissemination of findings
should be shared based on
organization culture and
philosophy; state laws should
be considered; standard
metrics for consistent
reporting should be used

Involve all levels of staff in
analysis, change and
communication about
events; improvement efforts
are recognized locally and
nationally; focus leadership
on building trust and
effective communication

Involvement of front line
workers; communication
from to top down
regarding what happened
and what was learned

RCA2: Improving Root
Cause Analysis and
Actions to Prevent Harm
Do not involve people
directly involved in the
event in the analysis- only
in the investigation and
action item feedback

Leadership oversight and
measurement of the overall
RCA process should occur;
sample metrics provided

Note. *Evidence level and strength were appraised using the Johns Hopkins Nursing Evidence Based Practice model (Dearholt &
Dang, 2012).
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Table 2
Project Timeline
Phase/ Project Step
Team meeting 1
Team meeting 2
Define
Review of literature, evidence appraisal
Team established; executive support
Charter
SIPOC
Affinity diagram, voice of customer
Project communication plan
Measure
Current State Process Map
Team Meeting 3
Team Meeting 4
Measure
Current State Process Map continued
Data Collection related to baseline
Affinity Diagram, barriers to ideal process
Analyze
Gap Analysis of literature and current state
Team Meeting 5
Team Meeting 6
Improve
Solutions Grid
Future State Process Map
Implementation Plan
Communication Plan
Pilot Testing Period

Month 1

Month 2

Month 3

Month 4

Month 5

Month 6

SENTINEL EVENT
Phase/ Project Step
Team Meeting 7
Team Meeting 8
Improve
Pilot Testing Period
Results Evaluations
Control
Recommendations
Control Plan
Replication Plan
Celebration!

28
Month 1

Month 2

Month 3

Month 4

Month 5

Month 6

SENTINEL EVENT

29

Table 3
Health System Adverse Event Management Policies and Procedures Compared to Review of Literature Best Practices
Adverse Event
Management
Category
Preparation &
Planning

Health System Policy and/or Procedure








Improvement demonstrated through
the AHRQ Culture of Safety Survey
Transparency improving but still have
a conservative stance due to litigation
exposure in Kentucky
Facility risk director holds primary
responsibility versus formal team;
other leaders are pulled in on a case
by case basis; most events have some
involvement of facility administrator,
chief nursing officer and medical
director where available and
applicable
Events identified through Patient
Safety Reporting System, Daily
Safety Call and internal
communication channels; are
currently exploring surveillance tools
such as trigger tools
Staff and leader engagement is
improving but there is still
opportunity

Best Practice from Literature Review



Create culture of safety with real
transparencya
Form interdisciplinary team for
immediate response with crisis
intervention and planned response,a, b, c,
d, e





Identify significant events through more
ways than just voluntary reporting
systemse
Engage all levels of leadership in safety
improvementa, c, e
Engage all workforce in safety
improvementa, d

Changes




Planned team
response
Improved
transparency
Engagement of staff,
providers and leaders

SENTINEL EVENT
Adverse Event
Management
Category
Investigation
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Health System Policy and/or Procedure








Equal investigations performed for
sentinel events and near misses but
near misses of other adverse events
may have a lower level investigation
Typically include best practice
components including flow charts &
timelines
Patient and family may not always be
involved in the investigation if they
do not request it or assert a complaint
or claim
Caregivers involved are included in a
respectful, non-punitive way
Investigations are sometimes delayed

Best Practice from Literature Review






Perform equal investigations for actual
and near miss eventsc, e
Consider interviews, medical record
reviews, equipment inspection, subject
matter expert consultationa, b, c, d, e
Interview the patient/familya, e
Involve the caregivers directly involved
in the event with respect and in a nonpunitive waya, c, d, e
Begin the investigation immediatelya, b,
c, d, e




Use flow charts when possibleb, e
Develop a timeline/chronologyb, c, e

Changes



Job aide to ensure
investigation is
thorough and credible
Standardized work
product

SENTINEL EVENT
Adverse Event
Management
Category
Analysis
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Health System Policy and/or Procedure











Root and apparent cause analysis is
typical; there is no standard use of
aggregate reviews
Interdisciplinary team performs the
analysis facilitated by the risk
director; some team members are
consistent across all analyses and
others are pulled in on a case by case
basis
Inconsistent methodologies used with
the exception of The Joint
Commission framework that is used
for all sentinel events
Inconsistent methodologies/findings
related to cause and contributing
factors
Caregivers involved in the event are
at the table during analysis
Patient and family are not included in
the analysis but findings are
sometimes shared
Timeline for completion varies
Internal communication of findings is
inconsistent

Best Practice from Literature Review



Root cause analysis and aggregate
reviewsa, b, c, d, e, f
Root cause analysis methodologies may
include fishbone diagram, 5 whys and
or The Joint Commission frameworka, b,

Changes




c, d, e, f





Look for probable cause but also
identify contributing factorsa, b, c, d, e, f
Findings should identify preceding
causes to any human factorsf
Deference to expertise versus authorityd,
e






Conflicting recommendations on
whether to include the caregivers
directly involved with the eventa, b, c, d, e
Conflicting recommendations on
whether to include the patient/familya, e
Complete within 30-45 days of
becoming aware of eventa, d, e
Communicate findings specifically to
involved caregivers, front line
staff/internally and to patient/familya, c, d,
e, f



Communicate findings of aggregate
reviews internallya, c, d, e, f



Provide formal
training for meeting
facilitators
Standardize tools
Standardize work
product including
summary sheet
Documentation in the
patient safety
reporting system

SENTINEL EVENT
Adverse Event
Management
Category
Corrective Actions
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Health System Policy and/or Procedure














Prioritization of causes and
contributing factors occurs
Action items focus on prevention
Responsibility and timeframes for
completion are assigned/established
Action items tend to remain at the
local and facility level; analysis group
is not empowered to assign system
actions
Many action items are transient and
focus on human factors; no standard
process for ensuring long term
solutions for every adverse event
Written policy requires a
determination of how the action items
are measured for effectiveness
including consideration of quality
measures; however, there is
inconsistent follow through in
practice
No standard process for monitoring
organizational change
There are no standard metrics for
measuring and reporting adverse
events, action items or recurrence of
events
Board of Trustees receives internal
“Days Since” report that displays the
number of days since an event that
meet the National Quality Forum
Serious Reportable Events criteria for
each facility. At times, they receive
limited information about why the
event happened and what actions
were recommended

Best Practice from Literature Review





Prioritize cause and contributing factors
and link corrective actions to eachb, c, d, e
Focus action items on prevention of
future eventsa, b, c, d, e
Assign responsibilitya, b, c, d, e
Establish timeframes for completiona, c,
c, e







Consider assignment at the local/unit,
facility and system levels for true
organizational changeb, d, e
Consider actions based on feasibility,
cost, resources needed, anticipated
effectivenessc, d, e
Monitor for effectiveness and
sustainability over timea, b, c, d, e
Develop metrics and standard
reportingc, e
Board of Trustees should be
accountable to long term system
solutions for each root cause analysisa, e

Changes





Documentation in the
patient safety
reporting system
Standardize the
process for tracking
open action items
Involve executive
sponsor in tracking
Create system to
measure effectiveness
of action items

SENTINEL EVENT
Adverse Event
Management
Category
Organizational
Learning Strategies
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Health System Policy and/or Procedure









Inconsistent feedback loop to
reporters and front line workers
regarding reporting and event
management
No formal reporting incentives or
consequences
Reporting is non-punitive but
oversight of this is needed to sustain
Need to develop process for
aggregate reviews with
communication of findings
Opportunity around participatory
management with event management
Opportunity to improve
organizational culture and structure to
use deference of expertise
Opportunity for standard
dissemination of alerts, lessons
learned and success stories related to
organizational change

Best Practice from Literature Review









Create a feedback loop for patient safety
event reporting for reporters and all
front line staffa, c, d, e, f
Create incentives to reportc
Ensure reporting is non-punitivea, b, d, e, f
Communicate aggregate trends and
related informationa, c, d, e, f
Use participatory management with
analysis of events and corrective
actionsc, d, e
Develop a feedback loop from analyses
to those involved in the event, front line
staff and all levels of leadershipa, c, d, e, f
Use a deference to expertise not
authority during event managementd, e
Provide routine dissemination of
lessons learned and changes made at the
local/unit, facility and system levelsa, c, d,

Changes






Event analysis
summary sheet to be
shared with people
directly involved in
the event and facility
leaders
Summary sheets will
be provided to system
patient safety for
shared learning
Designate resources
for common cause
analysis

e, f



Generate alerts, newsletters, internal
and external communications to share
safety informationa, c, d, e, f

“Respectful Management of Serious Clinical Events,” by J. Conway, F, Federico, K. Stewart, and M. Campbell, 2011. Retrieved
from www.ihi.org
a

“Systems Analysis of Clinical Incidents: The London Protocol,” by S. Taylor-Adams and C. Vincent, 2001. Retrieved from
www.imperial.ac.uk/
b

“Serious Safety Events: Getting to Zero,” by M. Hoppes, J. L. Mitchell, E. G. Vendetti, and R. F. Bunting, 2012. Retrieved from
www.ashrm.org
c

d

“Patient Safety Handbook,” 2011. Retrieved from www.patientsafety.va.gov
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“RCA2: Improving Root Cause Analysis and Actions to Prevent Harm,” by J. P. Bagian, D. Bonacum, J. DeRosier, J. Frost, R. J.
Fairbanks, T. Ghandi, H. Haskell, P. McGaffin, and F. Sheppard, 2015. Retrieved from https://www.npsf.org/?page=RCA2
e

“WHO Draft Guidelines for Adverse Event Reporting and Learning Systems,” 2005. Retrieved from
www.who.int/patientsafety/events/05/Reporting_Guidelines.pdf
f
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Table 4
Sentinel Event Management Model and Toolkit Outline
Learning Responses
from Events*
Identification

Sentinel Event Management Model & Toolkit Outline
Steps in Model:
 Identification of event or potential event (system policy available)
 Provide prompt and immediate care to patient and family
 Contain risk of immediate recurrence
 Initiate reporting and notification procedures (system policy available)
 Preserve evidence
 Conduct Meeting 1
o Attendees: executive sponsor, operational director and manager, director of risk
management, medical leadership and subject matter expert as needed
o Purpose: ensure immediate mitigation of event is occurring or has occurred; ensure needs of
the patient, family, staff and providers are being met; establish the known facts about the
event and launch the investigation; and identify key people involved and how to contact
them for interviews.
o Timing: should occur as soon as possible after event identification and no later than 72 hours
after notification.
 Conduct the investigation which includes interviews of the people directly involved, collection of
physical evidence, assessment of the environment, equipment and devices, review of medical
records, review of policies and procedures, review of literature, and consultation with subject matter
experts
Tools available in Cause Analysis Toolkit:
 Root Cause Analysis Process Map
 Sentinel Event Response Checklist
 Meeting 1 Checklist
 Who What When (WWW) grid
 Event Timeline Flow Chart
 Causal Factor Fishbone

SENTINEL EVENT
Learning Responses
from Events*
Analysis
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Sentinel Event Management Model & Toolkit Outline
Steps in Model:
 Conduct Meeting 2
o Attendees: the people who attended Meeting 1, peer representatives for the people directly
involved in the event, and subject matter experts as needed. The executive sponsor sends the
invitation to the meeting using a standard template.
o Purpose: to analyze the event to validate what happened and determine how and why the
event happened. This involves identifying causal and contributing factors.
o Home work is assigned to some attendees to research literature and professional practices
standards related to the causal factors and prevention of recurrence.
o Timing: should take place when the investigation is complete and no later than 30 days after
notification of the event
Tools available Cause Analysis Toolkit:
 Root Cause Analysis Meeting 2 Invitation Template
 Event timeline flowchart
 Cause Analysis Sign In Sheet
 Causal Testing Worksheet
 Root Cause Analysis Meeting 2 Talking Points
 Causal Factor Fishbone
 Root Cause Review Homework Assignment Sheet

SENTINEL EVENT
Learning Responses
from Events*
Change
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Sentinel Event Management Model & Toolkit Outline
Steps in Model
 Conduct Meeting 3
o Attendees: the people who attended Meeting 2, quality improvement and subject matter
experts as needed. The executive sponsor sends the invitation to the meeting using a standard
template.
o Purpose: to develop an evidence-based action plan to prevent recurrence of a similar event or
decrease the likelihood of patient harm if the event does recur.
o Timing: should take place within 1-2 weeks of Meeting 2 and no later than 45 days after
notification of the event.
o Action items are specific, assigned to an owner, include a deadline, are tracked to completion
and measured for effectiveness. Strength of actions are considered by the team.
 A Root Cause Analysis summary sheet is completed that includes the event description, causal
factors, key lesson learned and action plan. This is shared with the people directly involved as a
feedback loop and shared with others in the healthcare system for organizational learning.
Tools available in Cause Analysis Toolkit:
 Root Cause Analysis Meeting 3 Invitation Template
 Root Cause Analysis Meeting 3 Talking Points
 Cause Analysis Sign In Sheet
 WWW grid
 Action Plan
 Root Cause Analysis Summary Sheet

Note. *”Learning from Patient Safety Incidents: Creating Participative Risk Regulation in Healthcare,” by C. Macrae, 2008, Health,
Risk & Society, 10.
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Table 5
Sentinel Event Management Model Audit Sheet
Date of Event:

PSRS #:

Auditor:

Date of Audit:

Key Element of Model
Meeting 1:
Y = occurred within timeframe and achieved desired
outcome including standard tools and documentation
Investigation completed before Meeting 2 and flow chart
prepared
Meeting 2 invitation template used
Meeting 2:
Y = occurred within timeframe and achieved desired
outcome including standard tools and documentation
Assignments made to research solutions before Meeting 3
Meeting 3 invitation template used
Meeting 3:
occurred within timeframe and achieved desired outcome
including standard tools and documentation
Event summary sheet completed

Completed YES

Completed NO

Comments
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Table 6
Pilot Evaluation Plan
Indicator

Percentage of sentinel
events managed using
the standard event
management model
(process)

Measure/
Operational
Definition
Numerator = number
of sentinel events that
were managed using
the standard event
management model
Denominator =
number of sentinel
events that were
reported during pilot
testing period

Percentage of event
summary sheets used
for facility or system
feedback loop
(process)

Numerator = number
of sentinel event
summary sheets used
for facility or system
feedback loop
Denominator =
number of sentinel
events included in the
audit for the
percentage of sentinel
events managed
using the standard
model

Rationale for
Measure Selection

Data Collection
Approach

Benchmark

Target Goal

Compliance with
standard event
management model is
strongly desired and
evidence-based to
improve overall
culture of safety

Sentinel event report
will be produced from
reporting system;
events that did not have
all of the steps of the
standard process
completed due to the
time limitations of the
pilot testing period will
be excluded

No baseline or
benchmark available;
event management was
not previously
measured by the
hospital or health
system

100%

This is a high
reliability principle
that is key to
organizational learning
to prevent future
occurrences of similar
events

Sentinel event report
will be produced from
reporting system;
sentinel events included
in the audit for use of
standard event
management will be
audited specifically for
use of the event
summary sheet

No benchmark or
baseline available;
event summary sheets
not used in the past

100%

SENTINEL EVENT
Indicator

Sentinel Event Rate
(outcome)
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Measure/
Operational
Definition
Number of reported
sentinel events per
1,000 patient days

Rationale for
Measure Selection
Decrease in sentinel
events over time is
desired

Data Collection
Approach

Benchmark

Target Goal

Sentinel event report
will be produced from
patient safety reporting
system; patient days
will be obtained from
Finance department
reports. Chart will be
produced to
demonstrate baseline
rate, dates of
implementation of
standard event
management model at
each acute care facility,
and rates during testing
periods

Due to the change of
definition of sentinel
event by The Joint
Commission on January
1, 2015, the 2015 data
will be used as a
baseline. This rate will
be monitored long term

20% decrease each year
post model
implementation;
consideration will be given
to the fact that typically the
rate goes up due to
increased education,
awareness, and focus
before it comes down due
to intervention
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Table 7
Logic Model

RESOURCES

Project PI team

ACTIVITIES

Complete literature search
and evidence appraisal

Project leader time
Patient safety reporting
system administrator time
Education and Training time
for risk management
department
In house legal time for
applicable P&P revision and
consulting related to patient
safety work product

Conduct current policy and
procedure review
Perform gap analysis between
current policy and procedures
and evidence
Establish performance
improvement (PI) team
Perform PI using DMAIC PI
model

OUTPUTS

SHORT-AND
LONG-TERM
OUTCOMES

IMPACT

Standard taxonomy related to
sentinel events and related
policies and procedures

STG:
Evidence-based policies and
procedures related to sentinel
event management

Prevention of sentinel events

Standard policies related to
response,
communication/notification,
investigation, analysis,
corrective action and
organization learning after
sentinel events
Educated risk management
department

Improved organizational
learning after sentinel events
LTG:
Decreased sentinel events
Decreased costs related to
non-reimbursable care

Revise policies and
procedures

Decreased costs related to
claims and litigation
associated with sentinel
events

Education and training related
to standard sentinel event
management model to risk
management department

Improved compliance with
accreditation standards
associated with sentinel event
management

Improved culture of safety
Standard response to sentinel
events
Increased organization
learning after sentinel events
to decrease the likelihood of
recurrence
Improved communication and
awareness around sentinel
events to senior leaders and
board of trustees
Decreased costs from nonreimbursable care associated
with sentinel events
Consistent compliance with
accreditation standards
associated with sentinel event
management
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Table 8
Control Plan

Control
Element

Root cause
analyses
performed
using the
standard
model

Repeat
sentinel
events

Metric/
Measure
(Op
definition)
Number of
root cause
analyses
performed
with
standard
model
divided by
number of
root cause
analyses
performed
Number of
repeat
sentinel
events
divided by
number of
sentinel
events

Owner

Sampling
Plan

Measurement
Process (How?)

Goal Target

Reaction/
Response

Nursing
leadership
Hospital
leadership
Risk
leadership

PSRS reports Run reports in
100%
and or
PSRS; audit 100%
audits
for first 60 days
post
implementation
of model, then
50%

Meet with
cause analysis
teams to
identify and
address
barriers to
following the
desired
process

Hospital
leadership
Nursing
leadership

PSRS reports Facility and
system, level
data; Run PSRS
reports and
calculate

Review
causes and
action plans
in aggregate;
evaluate
effectiveness
of action plan

Need to
establish
baseline in
2016

SENTINEL EVENT

Control
Element

Action item
completion

Number and
rate of
sentinel
events

Metric/
Measure
(Op
definition)
Number of
root cause
analysis
action items
completed
or cancelled
on or before
deadline
divided by #
of root
cause
analysis
action items
Number of
sentinel
events per
1,000
patient days
or
admissions/
visits
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Owner

Sampling
Plan

Measurement
Process (How?)

CNO,
Hospital
Directors

PSRS reports System and
from actions facility level
module
data; run PSRS
reports and
calculate

Nursing
leadership

PSRS report
and patient
days data
from
Finance
dept.

Goal Target

75% first year
with gradual
improvement
to 100%

Reaction/
Response

Ensure open
action item
reports are
being
reviewed by
nursing
leaders on
routine
schedule;
Evaluate
barriers and
develop
action plan
Pull sentinel
Decreasing
Assess
events from PSRS trend 1 year
causation of
and combine
post model
sentinel
with patient
implementation events; redays/admissions/
evaluate
visits to produce
effectiveness
a rate at the
of sentinel
system and
event
hospital/ division
management
levels
model

SENTINEL EVENT

Control
Element

Metric/
Measure
(Op
definition)
Evaluation of Number of
root cause
root cause
analysis
analyses
audited and
found to be
acceptable
divided by
the number
of root
cause
analyses
audited

44

Owner

Sampling
Plan

System
Audit 100%
Director, Risk of root
Management cause
analyses for
60 days post
model
implementation; and
then audit
50%
annually

Measurement
Process (How?)

Goal Target

Report of cause 85% for 6
analyses will be
months; then
run in PSRS and
100%
events will be
selected for
audit. Audit will
be conducted
using modified
TJC RCA checklist

Reaction/
Response

If goal not
met,
improvement
plan will be
established
and more
frequent
monitoring
may take
place
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Table 9
Replication Plan
What Action Will Be Taken?
Resolution/Tasks
(Use a separate line for each
task)
Establish system wide timeline
Communication Plan for
stakeholders
Final revisions to Toolkit and
place on intranet
For Each Facility:
Establish Guiding Team
Create shared change vision
and strategy
Develop communication Plan
Complete gap analysis of
current state to new process
Complete barriers affinity
diagram
Develop implementation plan
and timeline
Develop education plan
Establish go live date
Implement system control plan

Assign Responsibility:
Name of Individual
Will Do This Task?

Planned
Start
Date

Planned
Completion How Will You Know
Date
This Is Done?

Enter date
Completed

